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Oh, What a Tangled Web... The
Continuing Evolution of Personal
Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based
Contacts
I. INTRODUCTION
Liberty D. Fender is an attorney working in a central Missouri law firm.
Returning to his office one afternoon, Liberty finds an e-mail from the presi-
dent of a new client, Mid-Missouri Boat Warehouse. The message asks Lib-
erty to call the president as soon as possible regarding a lawsuit filed against
her company. He calls immediately and she relates the following facts:
Boat Warehouse is being sued in a diversity action, filed in a Nevada
federal district court, alleging a products liability claim. The plaintiff, a Ne-
vada resident, visited relatives in Missouri last summer. One evening, the
plaintiff took the family speedboat, which had been manufactured by Boat
Warehouse, out on the Lake of the Ozarks. While cruising back to the dock,
the boat's throttle allegedly stuck in a forward, or open, position. The boat hit
the dock and the plaintiff was injured. He now claims that the throttle housing
was defectively designed and that Boat Warehouse knew the throttle might
stick, but failed to place an adequate warning where it would catch a boat
operator's attention. The plaintiff has asserted that the Nevada court has gen-
eral jurisdiction over Boat Warehouse based on a Web site maintained by the
company, www.midmoboathouse.com. Boat Warehouse's toll-free telephone
number, e-mail address, product information and a financing calculator all
appear on the Web site. Boat Warehouse's only other advertising is done by
television commercials and magazine ads that appear in Missouri and those
states sharing a border with Missouri.
After discussing these facts with his client, Liberty does not have a
strong feeling one way or the other about the merits of the case. His initial
instinct, however, is to arrange for local counsel to make a special appearance
and challenge the plaintiff's assertion of personal jurisdiction by filing a
12(b)(2) motion.' How do you suppose the Nevada district court judge will
rule on Liberty's motion?
2
This is just the sort of factual scenario that has become more and more
prevalent as litigation turned the comer on, and now presses further into, the
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2).
2. The author knows of no similar lawyer, company, or lawsuit, real or fic-
tional. Any similarity is purely unintentional.
1
Jansen: Jansen: Oh. What a Tangled Web
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
twenty-first century. The explosive impact of the Internet has, by its very
existence and lack of defining boundaries, opened the door to a fundamental
shift in our traditional conceptions of commerce, interaction and accessibility
to information. As the law struggles to address this medium of communica-
tion - as a realm unto itself requiring new law or simply as another method of
communication to which we will apply traditional notions - technology con-
tinues to march forward. New conundrums seem to pop up each year, as the
World Wide Web further invades daily life. Of course, the usual suspects are
involved: free speech, privacy, free press. But other challenges arise in the
very modem area of intellectual property law - for instance, does a Web site
created specifically for consumers in New York infringe the rights of a trade-
mark holder in California merely because she can see it on her home com-
puter in Los Angeles? Or is an invention, described by a Miami inventor on
his Italian-language home page but never physically created, considered pub-
lished in Europe because someone in Milan read it on the Web site? Intellec-
tual property aside, what of the ability of a man in Atlanta to harm a woman
in Seattle by posting terrible lies about her Online, or even stalking her in
Cyberspace?
These questions, though important, are purely exercises in academic
theorizing unless they can be presented in a forum that has the power to de-
cide their substantive issues. When parties resort to the legal system to settle
their differences, each side will have a preference of where it wants those
issues determined. When long distances between parties are involved, as is
often the case in Intemet-based disputes, one party will probably be unhappy
with the choice. That is where Liberty D. Fender will make what may be his
most vital contribution to the case - defeating or establishing the assertion of
personal jurisdiction.
II. THE INTERNET
The United States government originally designed the Internet as a
"communication system that could survive a nuclear war" because there was
no single path through which information flowed.3 Because of its availability
to the general public, the Internet has become a new realm within which to
act and be acted upon:
When one enters cyberspace, one can abandon almost all things
"real" about one's self; name, face, gender, age, nationality, and re-
ligion all can be erased, hidden or changed. The inhibitions and re-
strictions that accompany one's place and identity in the real world
can vanish in the virtual one.... In the real world, one's conduct is
3. Albert Z. Kovacs, Note, Quieting the Virtual Prison Riot: Why the Internet's
Spirit of "Sharing" Must Be Broken, 51 DUKE L.J. 753, 755 (2001).
[Vol. 71
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governed largely by one's location in space, which creates physical
limitations on behavior and helps to determine applicable law.4
The general benefits of the Internet, from convenience 5 to information
more serious endeavors, 6 are numerous. Even the ability to be "anonymous"
has an important role to play in the American Internet experience.7 But these
benefits do not come without a price. Online pornography and fraud are
among the higher-profile problems related to the Internet. For example, in
March of 2002, the FBI announced the filing of criminal charges against
eighty-nine people in over twenty states as a result of "Operation Candyman,"
a "nationwide crackdown on the proliferation of child pornography via the
Intemet."8 Those arrested included "Little League coaches, a teacher's aide, a
guidance counselor, school bus driver, foster care parent and professionals in
the medical, educational, military and law enforcement fields." 9 Another re-
cent investigation resulted in the arrest of an online pornography peddler who
used common misspellings of popular children's Web sites as domain names
4. Id. at 757-58.
5. See, e.g., Paige Norian, Comment, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Per-
sonal." Attempts to Reform Online Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52
CATH. U. L. REv. 803, 803 (2003) ("Millions of Americans use the Internet for various
activities everyday [sic]. We make travel plans, purchase gifts, pay bills, check our
credit card and bank balances, and send e-mail messages to friends and co-workers.").
6. See, e.g., The Ticker: The Internet, MEN'S HEALTH, May 2004, at 42 ("Pa-
tients who go online to find health information save their doctors time and are able to
make better decisions about their health." (citation omitted)).
7. See, e.g., Michael H. Spencer, Anonymous Internet Communication and the
First Amendment: A Crack in the Dam of National Sovereignty, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,
31 (1998) ("From a policy standpoint, anonymity could also prove to be beneficial to
interet communication. For instance, it could protect against actual retaliation or
harm that may come to an individual who reports wrongdoing on the part of a col-
league or a superior. Furthermore, one aerospace manufacturer encourages anony-
mous communication in order to gain insight to a broader range of ideas that may help
the company. It can help hide the identity of those who were abused and want to dis-
cuss these issues in certain newsgroups. Anonymity has even been characterized as
somewhat therapeutic. Such freedom can also be adventurous since an individual can
pretend to be anyone they choose." (citations omitted))
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to direct unsuspecting kids to his own porn sites.' 0 Additionally, FBI agents
travel the world pursuing Internet fraud cases.I I
Clearly the Internet offers opportunities for legitimate personal and
commercial transactions, but opportunities for wrongful and criminal behav-
ior are equally available. Whether certain Internet activity should or should
not be curtailed is an argument that will become more and more important in
society as access to the Web continues to grow. Such growth is likely consid-
ering that the President is stumping not for "a chicken in every pot", but "the
internet in every house."'
12
As availability expands, the opportunity for civil disputes could expand
proportionately, meaning that the American court system will be called upon
to adjudicate an even greater number of cases. Since these cases will be
predicated on Internet activity, the parties often will be from different parts of
the country, or even from different countries. As a threshold issue, courts
must decide whether such cases are properly before them.
In making this determination, courts have recognized that there is noth-
ing magical about the Internet. Cyberspace is not "a kingdom floating in the
mysterious ether,"1 3 "capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts built
from bricks and mortar." 4 It is simply a "rapidly developing means of mass
communication and information exchange."'
5
Long before the advent of the Internet, the United States Supreme Court
recognized that as knowledge evolves, so must the law: "As technological
progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase." 16 Similarly,
the Court has since noted that jurisdiction cannot be defeated "merely be-
cause the defendant did not physically enter the forum State."' 7 Despite these
10. Jailed For Targeting Kids, PEOPLE, Apr. 26, 2004, at 76. Among the 3,000
domain names owned by the suspect were Bobthebiulder.com, Dinsneyland.com and
Teltubbies.com. Id. Prosecution was possible only after passage of the Truth in Do-
main Names Act, which made it a crime to knowingly use misleading domain name to
lead minors to harmful material. Id.
11. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Press Release, To Catch a Cyberthief (Apr. 4,
2005), http://www.fbi.gov/page2/april05/cyberthiefD40405.htm (federal agent trav-
eled to Nigeria to help local authorities "track down cyber con artists who were prey-
ing on U.S. consumers and businesses through 'reshipping' scams").
12. See Bush Touts High-Speed Web Goal: President also lauds tax cuts during
New Mexico speech, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., Mar. 27, 2004 at 12A (U.S. government
"working toward wiring homes throughout the United States with high-speed Internet
access by 2007").
13. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
14. Id. at 510.
15. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
16. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
17. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).
[Vol. 71
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determinations, United States courts still "labor[] over how to apply tradi-
tional notions of personal jurisdiction to activities on the Internet."'' 8
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CYBERSPACE: WHERE WE'VE
BEEN AND WHERE WE ARE
A. Traditional Notions of Personal Jurisdiction
For a state court to establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in
an Intemet-related case, just as any other, the court must engage in a two-part
inquiry. First, the court must "examine whether jurisdiction is applicable un-
der the state's long-arm statute." Second, the court must "determine whether
a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements of due proc-
ess."'19 So, "[e]ven when the literal terms of the long-arm statute have been
satisfied, a plaintiff must still show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is
within the permissible bounds of the Due Process Clause.,'20 If the state's long-
arm statute extends jurisdiction coextensively with the Due Process Clause,
then the two inquires coalesce into one.21 However, if the long-arm statute pre-
cludes jurisdiction, the court need not reach the constitutional question. 22
Even with the introduction of Internet-related disputes, there remain just
two basic types of personal jurisdiction as delineated by the Supreme Court:
general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. 23
"[W]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit
arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is
exercising 'specific jurisdiction' over the defendant." 24 These are "qualitatively
significant contacts, those that a defendant purposefully initiates. ' To deter-
mine whether specific jurisdiction exists, a court considers the following:
18. Samuel 0. Manteaw, Entering the Digital Marketplace: E-Commerce and
Jurisdiction in Ghana, 16 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 345, 378 (2003).
19. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C.
Cir. 2000).
20. Id.
21. See Nutrition Physiology Corp. v. Enviros Ltd., 87 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651
(N.D. Tex. 2000).
22. See Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Because
we believe that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the instant case is proscribed
by the law of New York, we do not address the issue of due process.").
23. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408 (1984). Consent, domicile and presence may also establish personal jurisdiction.
24. Id. at 414 n.8.
25. Amanda Reid, Operationalizing The Law of Jurisdiction: Where in the
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(1) the extent to which the defendant "purposely avail[ed]" itself of
the privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the
plaintiffs' claims arise out of those activities directed at the State;
and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be con-
stitutionally "reasonable. "
26
On the other hand, "[w]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction ... in
a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum,
the State [is] .. .exercising 'general jurisdiction. '"'27 General jurisdiction
requires "qualitatively significant contacts, '28 which are often characterized
as "continuous and systematic." 29 Simply put, determining general jurisdic-
tion requires "a more demanding minimum contacts analysis than does spe-
cific jurisdiction. 30
Whether jurisdiction is general or specific, due process requirements are
satisfied when the defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' 31 In either case, "the touchstone remains
'purposeful availment' . . . [tihe goal of [which] is to give the [defendant]
'clear notice that it is subject to suit [in the forum State].', 32
In recent years, as courts have been confronted with attempts to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction based on a defendant's Internet activity, a pattern of
jurisdictional analysis has emerged, centered on two primary tests that gauge
how much activity satisfies the threshold of "minimum contacts." In other
words, the tests determine when an out-of-state defendant "purposefully
availed" itself of the forum state via the Internet.
Although there has been some dissatisfaction with "minimum contacts" as
a test of personal jurisdiction,33 it is the baseline from which courts must begin,
and it is unrealistic to expect any meaningful change. Perhaps Professor Stein
said it best: "[T]he Internet does not pose unique jurisdictional challenges.
People have been inflicting injury on each other from afar for a long time. Al-
26. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 712 (4th Cir.
2002) (citations omitted).
27. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9.
28. Reid, supra note 25.
29. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416.
30. Reiffv. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Tex. App. 2003).
31. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).
32. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., Note, A "Category Specific" Legislative Approach to the Internet
Personal Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1617, 1621 (2004)
[hereinafter A "Category Specific" Approach] ("The critique of Internet personal juris-
diction law as singularly unpredictable commits the basic fallacy of overlooking the
larger legal milieu: the essential unpredictability of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
in general as governed by the constitutionally mandated 'minimum contacts' test.").
[Vol. 71
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though the Internet may have increased the quantity of these occurrences, it has
not created problems that are qualitatively more difficult." 34
B. The "Zippo" Test
One of the tests for establishing Internet-based jurisdiction gets its name
from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.35 In Zippo, a manufac-
turer of tobacco lighters sued an Internet news service for trademark infringe-
ment based on the latter's registration of Internet domain names, including
"zippo.com." 36 The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation, brought suit against
the defendant, a California corporation, in Pennsylvania federal district court.37
Although the defendant had no physical presence in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff
premised its jurisdiction argument on two essential facts: that Pennsylvania
residents accessed the defendant's interactive Web site to sign up for the news
service, and that the defendant had contracted with seven internet access pro-
viders in Pennsylvania to allow those customers access to the news service. 38
Addressing the case in the context of specific jurisdiction,39 the court reviewed
previous Internet cases and determined "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction
can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Intemet." 4
The court articulated a sliding scale of Internet activity, occupied at one
end by "situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Inter-
net. ' 4 1 This includes "enter[ing] into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files" via the Internet. At this end of the scale, an assertion of jurisdiction is
proper 42 as this level of interactivity is seen as specifically intended interac-
tion with residents of the forum state.4 3
The other end of the Zippo scale is occupied by "situations where a de-
fendant has simply posted information" on "[a] passive Web site that does
34. Allen R. Stein, Symposium, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing
Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 411, 411
(2004).
35. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
36. Id. at 1121.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1126.
39. Id. at 1122.
40. Id. at 1124. The court reviewed such cases as CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson,
89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); and Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo.
1996). See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124-25, 1127.
41. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
42. Id.
43. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2003).
20061
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little more than make information available to those who are interested in
it. '4 4 In these cases, jurisdiction does not exist.45
In the middle of the scale are situations involving "interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer.' 46 The ap-
propriateness of establishing jurisdiction in these cases "is determined by
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
information that occurs on the Web site.' 47 Courts have described this middle
ground as the "troubling gray area on the continuum."
48
C. The "Effects" Test
The "effects" test was articulated by the Supreme Court in a defamation
case unrelated to the Internet, Calder v. Jones.49 An actress living and work-
ing in California sued a Florida-based magazine publisher for defamation in
California state court based on an article that appeared in the magazine.
50
Two individual defendants51 challenged California's jurisdiction, claiming
that as mere employees of the paper, they could not control the paper's circu-
lation in California, had no direct economic stake in California sales and
could not control the paper's marketing activities. 52 The Court dismissed their
argument by finding that both defendants knew the article "would have a
potentially devastating impact" on the plaintiff and that "the brunt of [the]
injury [to her reputation] would be felt by [her] in [California]. 53 Finally, the
Court held that California jurisdiction was proper because the defendants'
"intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury to [the plain-
tiff] in California." 54 This "targeting" of intentional and allegedly tortious
activity toward a foreign state has come to be known as the "effects" test for
establishing specific jurisdiction.




48. Reid, supra note 25, at 239.
49. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
50. Id. at 784-85. The actress was Shirley Jones, the paper was the National
Enquirer; and "[t]he article alleged that [Jones] drank so heavily as to prevent her
from fulfilling her professional obligations." Id. at 784-85, 789 n.9.
51. The two defendants were the reporter who wrote the story and his editor. Id.
at 785-86.
52. Id. at 789. The implication of their challenge was that, as individuals, they
had not purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of conducting activities in the
state of California. See id.
53. Id. at 789-90.
54. Id. at 791.
[Vol. 71
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D. The Federal Circuits'Application of the Tests
Before exploring the downsides of these tests and potential alternatives,
it is helpful to examine their current use in American jurisprudence. As the
jurisdictional argument is of constitutional concern, the federal circuit courts
of appeal provide examples of how these tests are currently being employed
and/or modified. Lacking new direction from the Supreme Court, their appli-
cation has neither been entirely inconsistent nor exactly uniform.
The Third Circ uit leans toward the Zippo test, at least in cases of specific
jurisdiction. In the trademark infringement case Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two,
S.A., the court employed the Zippo sliding scale to find no jurisdiction over the
defendant, although it did allow jurisdictional discovery.55 The court empha-
sized that merely operating an interactive Web site was insufficient to establish
jurisdiction. Rather, the Third Circuit found that to establish jurisdiction, "there
must be evidence that the defendant 'purposefully availed' itself of conducting
activity in the forum state, by directly targeting its web site to the state, know-
ingly interacting with residents of the forum state via its web site, or through
sufficient other related contacts."56 The defendant's Web site fell into the mid-
dle ground of the scale, leading the court to conclude that such a site required
"something more" - i.e. non-Intemet related contacts - before a finding of
specific jurisdiction: In the court's words, "[t]his limited record does not pro-
vide an occasion for us to spell out the exact mix of Internet and non-Intemet
contacts required to support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. That determi-
nation should be made on a case-by-case basis by assessing the 'nature and
quality' of the contacts."57 The court seemed to be suggesting that a merely
interactive sight, absent evidence of significant actual business conducted with
the state through the site, would not support jurisdiction. In any event, the court
looked upon the Zippo test with apparent approval.
The Fourth Circuit has expressly adopted the Zippo model in ALS Scan,
Inc. v. Digital Services Consultants, Inc., but adapted it to be consistent with
the effects test, thereby formulating its own "ALS Scan" test.58 In ALS Scan,
a copyright infringement action,59 the court asked, when an out-of-state citi-
zen "through electronic contacts, [be] conceptually [determined to have] 'en-
tered' the State via the Intemet."6 The court concluded that
55. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 2003).
56. Id. at 454.
57. Id. at 453 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1127 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
58. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Services Consultants, Inc., 293TF.3d 707 (4th Cir.
2002); see Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002).
59. Id. at 709.
60. ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 713.
2006]
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a State may... exercise judicial power over a person outside of the
State when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State,
(2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other in-
teractions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person
within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the
State's courts.61
Like the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied this Zippo/effects hy-
brid to cases of specific jurisdiction,62 and similarly required the defendant to
have acted intentionally. 63 In fact, the court specifically refused to extend this
model to cases of general jurisdiction "over out-of-state persons who regu-
larly and systematically transmit electronic signals into the State via the
Internet based solely on those transmissions."64 This court determined that-
"something more" was needed to establish general jurisdiction, although it
declined to decide of what "something more" might consist.
65
The Fifth Circuit likewise found the Zippo test ill-suited for questions of
general jurisdiction. In Revell v. Lidov, the court examined a claim premised
on the posting of an allegedly defamatory article on a Web site. The Texas
plaintiff attempted to sue the Massachusetts-based writer and New York-
based University that hosted the site by filing a claim in a Texas federal
court.66 This court, too, employed the Zippo scale in analyzing the claim of
specific jurisdiction, but also expressly examined the claim under the effects
test requirements. 67 Although, like Calder, this was a defamation action, the
court used both the Zippo and effects tests as complementary inquiries, rather
than as exclusive alternatives. Ultimately the court found specific jurisdiction
68was not warranted under either.
The Sixth Circuit appears to view the Zippo scale favorably in regard to
specific jurisdiction, particularly one end of the continuum. In Neogen Corp.
v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., a trademark infringement case, the court applied
Zippo, determining that "[a] defendant purposefully avails itself of the privi-
lege of acting in a state through its website if the website is interactive to a
degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the
state." 69 Consistent with the Third and Fourth Circuits, the court required
61. Id. at 714.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 715.
65. Id.
66. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
67. Id. at 470.
68. Id. at 476.
69. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, lnc, 282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002)
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some sort of intentional conduct. 70 But unlike the Third and Fourth Circuits,
the Sixth Circuit determined that the effects analysis could be applied consis-
tently with Zippo: "'purposeful availment' is something akin to a deliberate
undertaking to do or cause an act or thing to be done in [the forum] or con-
duct which can be properly regarded as a prime generating cause of the ef-
fects resulting in [the forum].'
Interestingly, the Sixth Circuit also found that an interactive Web site
could result in a finding of general jurisdiction under the Zippo test; interac-
tivity that turns into actual contracts between the defendant and forum resi-
dents could be continuous and systematic enough to warrant a finding of gen-
eral jurisdiction. 72 Were the assertion specific jurisdiction, this might be con-
sistent with the other circuits' requirement for "something more." In addition,
general jurisdiction based on those resulting contracts is determined not by
the percentage of the defendant's overall business they represent, but rather
by whether they are more than merely "random, fortuitous, or attenuated"
when viewed in the context of the forum state.73 Essentially, the Sixth Circuit
injected a quality analysis into what should be only a quantity requirement.
In Lakin v. Prudential Securities, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held that, while
the Zippo sliding scale is an appropriate approach in cases of specific jurisdic-
tion, the court would not presumptively apply it for cases of general jurisdic-
tion.74 Instead, the court stuck with its own five-factor jurisdictional analysis,
amalgamated from Supreme Court decisions, which weighs different factors
depending on their relevance to the case.75 Thus, although an important factor
in the analysis, interactivity of a Web site must be considered along with the
"nature and quality of the contacts," and the "quantity of the contacts." 76 In
the courts words, "[u]nder the Zippo test, it is possible for a Web site to be
very interactive, but to have no quantity of contacts. In other words, the con-
tacts would be continuous, but not substantial. This is untenable in a general
jurisdiction analysis." 77
The court was very interested in quantity, looking for numbers: the
number of times that resident consumers accessed a site; the number of con-
sumers who requested information through the site or used an online applica-
70. Id.
71. Id. at 891 (emphasis added) (quoting Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co.,
273 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Mich. 1978)).
72. See id. at 890-91.
73. Id. at 891-92 (citation omitted).
74. Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003).
75. Id. (citing Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir. 1965)).
The five factors are (1) quantity of the contacts, (2) nature and quality of the contacts,
(3) source and connection of the cause of action with the contacts, and, to a lesser
degree, (4) interest of the forum state and (5) convenience. Id. at 711-12 (citing Aft
tanase, 343 F.2d. at 197).
76. See id. at 711-12.
77. Id. at 712.
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tion; the number of responses by defendant's representatives; and the number
of contracts resulting from the online contacts.7 8 Thus, in the Eighth Circuit,
even a Web site falling into Zippo's middle ground might still, in light of the
quantity and quality of contacts, result in a finding of general jurisdiction.
Although agreeing that a defendant's overall percentage of business represented
by the contacts is irrelevant, the court required those contacts to be "continuous
and systematic," not just more than merely random or fortuitous. 79
The Ninth Circuit applied the Zippo test to find general jurisdiction
when the defendant's website was so interactive as to function as a "virtual
store." In Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., the court reviewed Gator's
attempt to obtain general jurisdiction over L.L. Bean under a petition for de-
claratory judgment in a trademark infringement case. Finding that the nature
of L.L. Bean's Web site was the functional equivalent of a physical, brick-
and-mortar store, the court stated that, even if the Web site was Bean's only
contact with the forum state, there would still be general jurisdiction.8 ' The
court placed this level of Web site interactivity firmly at the end of the Zippo
scale constituting "'clearly do[ing] business over the internet. ' ' ,82 According
to the Ninth Circuit, the "millions of dollars in sales, driven by an extensive,
ongoing, and sophisticated sales effort involving very large numbers of direct
email solicitations and millions of catalog sales, qualifie[d] as 'substantial' or
'continuous and systematic' commercial activity." 83 However, just a year
earlier, the same court explicitly used the effects test to analyze "purposeful
availment" of an essentially passive Web site in context of determining spe-
cific jurisdiction in a trademark infringement case. 84
In Soma Medical International v. Standard Charter Bank, the Tenth
Circuit used the Zippo sliding scale to analyze a purely passive Web site's
application to a claim of general jurisdiction, but the court did not expressly
use the scale to determine specific jurisdiction. s5 Though the plaintiff charac-
terized it as "soliciting business," the court found that the Web site did noth-
ing more than make information available to interested users.8 6 Although
ostensibly applying Utah law, the circuit court held that general jurisdiction
was not appropriate under the Zippo scale because the defendant's other con-
78. Id. at 712-13.
79. Id. at 709.
80. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2003).
81. Id. at 1079.
82. Id. at 1080 (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp.
1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. See Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019-20 (9th Cir.
2002) ("purposeful availment" requirement satisfied under effects doctrine when
passive Web site combined with "something more" - print and radio advertising cam-
paign directed towards forum state).
85. 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 1297 (citation omitted).
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tacts with Utah were so insignificant.87 As for specific jurisdiction, the court
also used a due process analysis, dismissing the Web site as too passive to
constitute "minimum contacts," but never expressly re-mentioned or cited
Zippo in its specific jurisdiction analysis. 88
The Federal Circuit appears to have impliedly accepted the rationale of
the Zippo scale for cases of specific jurisdiction. In 3D Systems, Inc. v. Aaro-
tech Laboratories, Inc., a patent infringement case, the court found that a
Web site that forwarded reply e-mails to another site was passive and, thus,
did not implicate specific jurisdiction. 89 Without directly mentioning Zippo,
the court favorably cited an earlier Ninth Circuit decision that had employed
the sliding scale.
90
Finally, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has apparently
endorsed the Zippo scale for questions of both general and specific jurisdic-
tion. In Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., the court found that a defen-
dant could do business within a forum both continuously and systematically
by entering into contracts involving "the knowing and repeated transmission
of computer files over the Internet" with forum residents.9 1 Drawing this lan-
guage directly from Zippo, the court nonetheless required an analysis of the
actual volume of contacts before it could determine the jurisdiction ques-
tion.9 2 Yet the court seemed to generally approve of the scale itself.
9 3
The First, Second, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have yet to officially
comment on the application of these tests to Internet-related jurisdictional
questions, but some of their cases and/or cases from district courts in these
circuits shed light on their positions. The First Circuit, for instance, might
limit the "effects" test to cases of defamation only,94 but could also be recep-
tive to the Zippo scale. 95 The Seventh Circuit may look favorably on the
87. Id. at 1296-97 (defendant filed a few UCC financing statements, recorded
several security interest instruments, and filed five civil actions to recover monies on
foreclosures).
88. Id. at 1297.
89. 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
90. See id. (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th
Cir. 1997)).
91. Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001)
("As we have previously noted, Calder's 'effects' test was specifically designed for use
in a defamation case.... Thus, whether Calder was ever intended to apply to numerous
other torts, such as conversion or breach of contract, is unclear." (citations omitted)).
95. See generally Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221, 1226 (N.H. 2002) (The
New Hampshire Supreme Court analyzes the Zippo framework but found it unhelpful
because the case at bar involved the defendant's Internet activity through an auction
site rather than its own Web site).
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Zippo analytical framework,96 as evidenced by its application in Indiana dis-
trict courts.9 7 The same may be true for the Eleventh Circuit,98 and for the
Second Circuit as well. 99
E. Summary of the Current State of the Law
Clearly, the waters are muddy. Circuits are currently split on whether
the Zippo scale can be used to establish general jurisdiction, whether the ef-
fects test is appropriate as an alternative, and, more fundamentally, how ex-
actly to characterize Web sites. In fact, not every court agrees such tests are
even necessary. At least one district court in the Seventh Circuit has ques-
tioned why adopting a specialized test for Internet cases is even necessary,' ° °
noting Judge Easterbrook's contention that, regarding technology, specialized
tests are often "'doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles." 0'
Although one commentator has suggested that in 2001 courts were mov-
ing away from Zippo to a broader, effects-based analysis,'0 2 it is clear that the
sliding scale framework is alive and well, although perhaps more frequently
complemented by the effects doctrine. And as a practical matter, jurisdiction
based on a defendant's Internet activity is still, like it or not, at its heart, an
analysis of "minimum contacts." Although many of the circuits endorse the
analytical framework of the Zippo continuum, 103 none of them (with the pos-
sible exception of the First Circuit) " would likely ignore a well-argued ap-
plication of the Calder effects test; in fact, the Fourth Circuit has explicitly
blended the two.' 
05
96. See generally Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 549 (7th Cir.
2004) (noting that other circuits recognize both general and specific jurisdiction con-
ferred by the operation of an interactive Web site, including a citation to Gorman, but
stating that "[wie need not decide in this case what level of 'interactivity' is sufficient
to establish personal jurisdiction based on the operation of an interactive website"
because a passive site will not support such exercise of jurisdiction).
97. See Search Force, Inc. v. Dataforce Int'l, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776-78
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (including a long discussion of the Zippo framework and noting
Indiana state court rejection of the "effects" test for trademark issue).
98. See Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
(regarding alcohol sales to a minor over the Internet).
99. See On-Line Techs. v. Elmer Perkin Corp., 141 F. Supp. 2d 246, 265 (D.
Conn. 2001) (Web site falls into "middle ground" of the Zippo sliding scale).
100. Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154,
1160-61 (W.D. Wis. 2004).
101. Id. (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996)).
102. See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty
For Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1371 (2001).
103. See supra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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Whichever approach is used, the key in Internet cases seems to boil down
to "targeting." Under the "effects" test for specific jurisdiction, the Web site
content must be intentionally directed at the forum state with knowledge that
any injury will occur primarily in that state. 10 6 Under Zippo, which was formu-
lated originally for specific jurisdiction, a Web site must also be targeted at the
forum state to some extent. 10 7 If the targeting rises to the level of doing busi-
ness in the state, then the courts appear willing to find specific jurisdiction,10 8
and if the quantity of those targeted activities is sufficiently high, some are even
willing to find general jurisdiction. 09 Thus, while American jurisprudence may
lack a uniform test for determining jurisdiction of Internet-based activity, the
concept of targeting underlies each of the various approaches.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CYBERSPACE: WHERE WE SHOULD
Go
A. Criticism of the Tests
The popularity of the Zippo scale and the application of the effects doc-
trine to Internet cases evolved out of criticism of an early line of cases best
represented by the decision in Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. "10 In
that case, a Connecticut plaintiff asserted jurisdiction over a Massachusetts
defendant based on a purely passive Web site containing advertising and a
toll-free telephone number."' The plaintiff alleged that such a Web site
amounted to "try[ing] to conduct business within the state of Connecticut."'
112
The defendant asserted that its residence and principal place of business were
in Massachusetts and that it had no offices or employees in Connecticut." 
3
The court found general jurisdiction, stating that the defendant's use of its
Web site meant it had directed its advertising, on a continuous basis, not only
at Connecticut but at every state.11 4 The clear implication of the court's hold-
ing was that merely posting a Web site in any way analogous to an adver-
tisement conferred jurisdictional power on every state whose residents could
106. See generally supra Part III.C.
107. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
109. Under general jurisdiction, courts tend to draw a distinction between doing
business in a forum (insufficient) and doing business with a forum (sufficient). "This
is because engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of
itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state's bor-
ders." Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2000) (citation omitted).
110. 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
111. Id. at 163, 165.
112. Id. at 164.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 165.
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access that site. By posting to the Web the defendant could reasonably antici-
pate being sued anywhere the Web reached. A logical extension of that rea-
soning would also subject the defendant to jurisdiction in any foreign nation
where its site could be accessed.
After Inset, and subsequent approving opinions," 5 courts realized the
tremendous impact such a holding could have: "[t]his approach would stifle
future Internet growth, as would-be Internet participants would be forced to
weigh the advantages of the Internet with the potential of being subject to
legal jurisdiction throughout the world."' 1 6 As a matter of common sense,
people and businesses would choose not to become Internet participants
rather than expose themselves in such a manner, and any societal policy goals
encouraging the growth of e-commerce would be shattered. Instead, courts
turned to the Zippo framework and the effects doctrine to tailor a more palat-
able inquiry for jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, neither the Zippo nor the effects test has offered the level
of certainty or predictability that such rules should ideally provide - perhaps
because they are too shallow, and they are definitely not unifying." 7 The
effects test has come under fire for essentially the same reason as the Inset
decision: it is "the source of considerable uncertainty because Intemet-based
activity can ordinarily be said to cause effects in most jurisdictions." 8s This
analysis, however, is far too broad a criticism because true "effects" analysis
essentially requires conduct "calculated to cause injury" and a "focal point"
where the "brunt" of the injury is felt." 9 While the effects of Internet conduct
may be felt in many forums, the intent requirement allows a court to find a
particular focal point. Those other effects are presumably random, fortuitous
and attenuated and, thus, are an insufficient basis for a finding ofjurisdiction.
Although speaking in terms of product liability, the Ninth Circuit provided an
apt description of the present state of Internet-based personal jurisdiction:
"We accept the risk that words and ideas have wings we cannot clip and
which carry them we know not where."' 
20
Both the effects analysis and the Zippo scale have been criticized be-
cause they "are highly fact-dependent, [and] their application is likely to yield
115. See, e.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1996).
116. Geist, supra note 102, at 1362.
117. See Easterbrook, supra note 101.
118. Geist, supra note 102, at 1381.
119. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-91 (1984).
120. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991); accord
Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("Would any author
wish to be exposed to liability for writing on a topic which might result in physical
injury? e.g. How to cut trees; How to keep bees?"). Just as apropos, would any author
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inconsistent results."' 2 1 Though undoubtedly true on some level, this criticism
also oversteps. It is as much an indictment of the entire "minimum contacts"
test as anything' 22 - the only qualifier being that the factual scenarios pre-
sented to courts in the physical world have become repetitious and lend them-
selves more easily to analogizing than the situations involving Web sites.
Certainly the focal point for the brunt of the criticism leveled at the Zippo
sliding scale is the middle ground, "interactivity" portion of the continuum:
The majority of websites fall into Zippo's middle category. As
formulated and developed, Zippo provides little guidance for de-
termining how to deal with such sites. It merely states that the ex-
tent to which the website is interactive and commercial will deter-
mine the outcome. It does not specify how much interactivity or
commercialism suffices, nor even how those two characteristics
ought to interact. Moreover, the Zippo test does nothing to limit the
number of jurisdictions with which a website operator would be
deemed to have made contact once her website is held sufficiently
interactive and commercial. Regardless of the level of nteractivity
or commercialism that a court chooses as its threshold, once a
website crosses it, purposeful availment would be established with
every state in the country.'
23
Though accurate, the criticism once again sweeps too broadly. Courts
have tended to mitigate the potential breadth of this middle ground by their
requirement, even in the context of specific jurisdiction, of "something
more."
, 124
Indeed, the middle ground of Zippo may not be so troubling as it first
appears. In practice, judges have dealt with different sorts of interactivity
without having their heads explode. Pennsylvania, where Zippo originated,
may be leading the way. 125 In Mar-Eco, Inc. v. T&R & Sons Towing & Re-
121. Cherie Dawson, Note, Creating Borders on the Internet: Free Speech, The
United States, and International Jurisdiction, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 637, 653 (2004).
122. Criticism of "minimum contacts" in general may or may not be warranted,
but because of its constitutional roots, alternatives that do not operate within the con-
fines of "minimum contacts" are useless to judges and litigators.
123. Note, No Bad Puns: A Different Approach to the Problem of Personal Juris-
diction and the Internet, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1821, 1834 (2003) [hereinafter No Bad
Puns]; see also Reid, supra note 25, at 265 ("Under Zippo, this gray area on the con-
tinuum is troublesome because courts have few guidelines for assessing the quality
and nature of these contacts.").
124. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 453 (3d Cir. 2003);
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Servs. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002).
125. Also in spite of Zippo's initial limited application to specific jurisdiction,
Pennsylvania courts, both state and federal, appear willing to extend its application to
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cords, Inc., a Pennsylvania state court found general jurisdiction under the
Zippo framework's middle ground. 126 The Web site at issue allowed custom-
ers "to apply for employment, search the new and used vehicle inventory,
apply for financing to purchase a vehicle, calculate payment schedules, order
parts and schedule service appointments."'12 7 Additionally, the defendant's
site did not help its argument by including this statement: "[]his page allows
you to handle nearly all of the financial aspects of a vehicle purchase. We've
made shopping for a car much easier for you by allowing you to shop and
virtually complete the entire transaction via your computer."'1
28
In Hlavac v. DGG Properties, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania re-
fused to find general jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.' 29 In that case, a
Connecticut resort's Web site allowed customers to purchase gift certificates
and contained an e-mail link through which to correspond.' 30 The court noted a
trend against letting e-mail links alone confer jurisdiction,' 3 1 but insinuated that
Web sites allowing users to actually make travel reservations by inputting pref-
erences could do so.' 32 The court's language is illuminating because it charac-
terized the travel Web sites that offered the latter feature as "truly interac-
tive,"'133 while finding no jurisdiction based on the defendant's particular site.
There seems to be an implication that this judge, at least, distinguished levels of
interactivity into some sort of normative pattern. As the public becomes more
sophisticated with regard to the Internet in general, surely the judicial ranks will
follow suit and the "troubling gray area" will continue to dissipate. So, in spite
of Zippo's criticism as being too unpredictable or fact-intensive, the test may
actually establish a solid foundation in this respect.
Courts also require "something more" under the effects test, as illus-
trated by the Ninth Circuit:
[Courts] have struggled somewhat with Calder's import, recogniz-
ing that the case cannot stand for the broad proposition that a for-
eign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state always gives
rise to specific jurisdiction. We have said that there must be
"something more," but have not spelled out what that something
more must be. We now conclude that "something more" is what
general jurisdiction. See Hlavac v. DGG Props., No. Civ. A 04-6112, 2005 WL
839158 at *4 n.5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2005).
126. Mar-Eco, Inc. v. T&R & Sons Towing & Records, Inc., 837 A.2d 512, 517-
18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
127. Id. at 517.
128. Id.
129. Hlavac v. DGG Props., 2005 WL 839158 (E.D. Pa., Apr. 8, 2005).
130. Id. at *5.
131. Id.
132. Id. Examples cited by the court in note 6 of the opinion included hotels.com,
expedia.com and orbitz.com. Id. at *5 n.6.
133. Id. at *5.
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the Supreme Court described as "express aiming" at the forum
state.'
34
The "something more" under the effects analysis and the "something more"
under Zippo's middle ground are simply parallels of the same concept.
In Toys "R" Us, Inc., the Third Circuit characterized the "more" as non-
Intemet contacts - traditional, real-world activity coupled with the electronic
activity on a Web site.1 35 These real-world activities offer a picture of the de-
fendant's intent; if virtual activity leads to tangible activity, a court can be more
certain a defendant knows with whom it is dealing and, therefore, where.
Finding "something more" is generally easy to do in a defamation, "ef-
fects" test context. The content of the Intemet posting is generally fairly obvi-
ously directed at a particular person or persons.' 36 Whether this is true in the
context of other passive Web sites, (for example a fraudulent posting, a negli-
gent misrepresentation or a trademark infringement) is not so clear. Recall,
though, that "effects" and "intentionality" are two separate issues. Just because
the passive site causes effects in a forum does not mean it was purposely di-
rected there - that is the risk we are willing to accept, words carried "we know
not where." But as soon as prospective defendants acknowledge that they know
with whom they are dealing, the threshold is crossed. In these situations, tradi-
tional contacts serving as a sort of "follow-up" to the electronic contact may
well confer jurisdiction because, at that point, defendants know their "target."
Bancroft & Masters v. Augusta National Inc. exemplifies this point.' 37
In Bancroft, a California computer company sued a Georgia corporation
in California over trademark issues.' 38 The plaintiff owned the Web site do-
main name "masters.com," while the defendant owned the name "mas-
ters.org.' 39 The defendant sent a letter to the domain name registrar in Vir-
ginia initiating a domain name dispute resolution policy. 40 The plaintiff filed
an action for a declaratory judgment in California, seeking a finding that its
domain name did not constitute infringement 141 and contending that the de-
fendant's letter to the Virginia registrar was calculated to wrongfully interfere
with the plaintiff's use of the domain name and to misappropriate that
134. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
135. Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 454 (3d Cir. 2003).
136. This is probably also true for some actions like harassment or stalking.
137. 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
138. Id. at 1084-85.
139. Id. at 1084. The term "masters" in the context of this case refers to a major
championship golf tournament, "The Masters" held each year in Augusta, Georgia. Id.
140. Id. at 1085 ("Under this policy, B & M had three options: (1) voluntarily
transfer the master.com domain name to ANI; (2) allow the domain name to be placed
'on hold,' meaning that it could not be used by either party; or (3) obtain a declaratory
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name. 142 The Ninth Circuit held that, under the effects test, a finding of "pur-
poseful availment" was appropriate because the letter, although addressed to
Virginia, was expressly aimed at the California plaintiff with knowledge that
its effects would be felt in California.143 Such a holding is consistent with
other cases, especially those decided in the Ninth Circuit.44
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit found that specific jurisdiction was lack-
ing in Young v. New Haven Advocate. 45 In that case, the warden of a Virginia
prison sued two Connecticut newspapers in a Virginia court.146 Reporters for
the papers had written stories about the state of Connecticut's contract with
the state of Virginia, which called for the transfer of prisoners to Virginia to
alleviate prison overcrowding in Connecticut.147 One of the stories included
information regarding alleged harsh treatment of prisoners in the Virginia
prison, the difficulty of Connecticut families in visiting their incarcerated
family members in Virginia, and a Connecticut senator's statements express-
ing concern about Confederate memorabilia in the Virginia warden's of-
fice. 48 The other article questioned the transfers and reported on letters writ-
ten by the inmates to their families alleging cruel treatment.1 49 The warden
sued for defamation, claiming Virginia could exercise personal specific juris-
diction because the papers had published the articles on their Web sites, for
any Virginia reader to see, and because the content of the articles caused
harm to the warden in Virginia.150 The court, using the ALS Scan test, deter-
mined specific jurisdiction was inappropriate because the Web sites were
directed to a Connecticut audience and intended to provide information to a
local market only.' 5' The articles themselves were also directed at local read-
ers, discussing the effects of the situation in Connecticut. 52
With the ALS Scan test, the Fourth Circuit combined the Zippo scale and
the effects doctrine into a comprehensive analysis.'53 That court, however,
142. Id. at 1087.
143. Id. at 1088. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, at
least as far as jurisdiction was concerned, the court had to assume the letter itself was
wrongful. See id. at 1087.
144. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.
1998) (jurisdiction deemed proper in domain name dispute when the defendant posted
a passive Web site but followed with letters to the plaintiff demanding money to re-
linquish names).
145. 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).





150. Id. at 260.
151. Id. at 263.
152. Id. at 263-64.
153. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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did not do anything unusual. In reality, Zippo already wraps at least part of
the effects test into the bottom two-thirds of the sliding scale. Indeed, courts
applying Zippo have no problem finding passive Web sites (although not
enough to confer jurisdiction by themselves, according to Zippo) as a basis
for jurisdiction when combined with "something more." This "something
more" (otherwise known as express aiming) is found by looking for either
non-Internet contacts or knowledge of the content's "focal point." The same
goes for interactive sites; add "something more" and jurisdiction, especially
specific jurisdiction, is acceptable.
Looking beyond the issue of "passive" sites, the real problem with the
upper two-thirds of the Zippo test's sliding scale is that quality of contacts
has become a proxy for quantity of contacts. Although certainly not true in
every case, it appears that the Zippo sliding scale has become a test of neces-
sity rather than a test of sufficiency.
According to the scale, an interactive, middle-ground Web site allows a
user to "exchange information with the host computer."'154 Whether this in-
cludes sites that simply have hyperlinks to other sites is unclear. Have users
who clicked on a hyperlink that took them to another basically passive site
"exchanged" anything with the host computer? From a common sense stand-
point, probably not, and there is no logical difficulty with such a conclusion.
Presumably interactivity includes things like sending and receiving e-mail,
inputting a credit card number and/or placing an order, and perhaps even
something like a financing calculator. 155 Certainly it would be unacceptable
to say that the mere availability of such interactive features pushes the site to
the next level of the scale, as that is no better than saying that mere access to
a site by anyone in the world means jurisdiction anywhere in the world.
Clearly, somebody has to use the interactive features before it is appropriate
to look at their nature and quality. This too is a logical conclusion, since the
definition of "contacts" includes not only "[a] coming together or touching, as
of objects or surfaces," but an "[a]ssociation; relationship."' 156 Regardless of
where a site falls on the Zippo continuum, it is the nature and quality of the
relationship arising as a result of the interactive features that drives the analy-
sis, and this is equally true at the top of the scale. Web sites that seek to do
business over the Internet are no different from purely "passive" sites unless
business is being done - that is, unless relationships have resulted.
The difficulty becomes clear when courts make statements like the fol-
lowing in the context of specific jurisdiction:
154. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
155. For instance, returning to Liberty D. Fender's scenario, his client might use
such a calculator in this way: the user chooses the boat she likes plus any additional
extras and accessories; inputs her amount of down payment; chooses how many months
she wants to finance; and receives a calculation of the corresponding monthly payment.
156. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 395 (4th ed. 2000).
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Courts in the Third Circuit have not specifically stated whether a
defendant's single purchase of an item via the Internet, without
more, suffices as a premise upon which a state may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over that defendant. However, decisions in this
area of law indicate that commercial activity via the Internet must
be substantially more regular and pervasive to constitute "purpose-
ful availment of doing business" within a given state.
157
If the plaintiff's claim arises out of the single contact, then why is there
any requirement for "more regular and pervasive" activity? Is not the point of
specific jurisdiction to allow even a single contact to confer the necessary juris-
dictional power? If one chooses to drive a car from Missouri to Florida, then
one can (realistically) choose a route through either Illinois or Arkansas; and if
one's negligence causes a car accident in one of those states, then specific ju-
risdiction would be proper there. The fact that the car was present in the forum
state shows all the intent needed: the driver purposely drove it there.
But when contacts are discussed in terms of relationships, especially
electronic relationships, rather than tangible touching, courts seem to become
very uncomfortable. This is the true tension - the disconnect - between Inter-
net cases and more traditional cases. When the relationships are the result of
an Internet Web site, the requirement of "something more," or "express aim-
ing" becomes the method of assuaging the discomfort, and it does so by em-
phasizing quantity as a measure of quality, blurring the line between specific
and general jurisdiction. Real world drivers who causes accidents in Arkansas
can easily be said to have intentionally directed their cars into the state be-
cause that is where they had to have driven it. But in the case of virtual driv-
ers who cause virtual accidents, it is less clear where they "drove." Figura-
tively speaking, virtual drivers can drive through Illinois and Arkansas at the
same time. To counter this jurisdictional uncertainty, courts seem to require
virtual drivers to cause that virtual car wreck over and over again. That way,
courts know the virtual drivers were in fact aiming for virtual Arkansas.
This is no different than the top of the Zippo scale, where the "clearly
do[ing] business over the Internet" standard is supposed to require the "know-
ing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet."'' 5 In the
context of specific jurisdiction, this requires the "virtual car-wreck" to happen
over and over. Quantity has usurped quality in the top two-thirds of the scale.
Of course, this may be merely a philosophical argument. After all, even in
specific jurisdiction, the benchmark is "minimum" contacts, which implies at
least one, and which can certainly mean more than one. The troubling aspect,
however, is that many courts seem to view Zippo as a benchmark itself - that
is, the plaintiff must demonstrate "something more" by showing a quantity of
157. Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (D.N.J. 2002).
158. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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contacts. But Zippo is really just a test of sufficiency, illustrating that if a case
achieves those levels of contacts, then jurisdiction is likely proper.
Not all courts see Zippo this way. For example, in Directory Dividends,
Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc. a federal trial court held general jurisdic-
tion proper purely on the "express aiming" aspect, without questioning
whether actual relationships resulted. 59 The defendant operated a Web site
that the court determined was directed at Pennsylvania residents because a
user could choose "Pennsylvania" from a pull-down menu or enter a Penn-
sylvania zip code and see a list of products for sale in that state.' 60 "This spe-
cifically intended internet contact with Pennsylvania [was] sufficiently sys-
tematic and continuous that the website alone [could] be used as the basis for
a finding of general personal jurisdiction."' 61 This from a court in the very
state where Zippo was first decided.
Would the Eighth or Ninth Circuits have reached this result? The Direc-
tory Dividends court reached its determination without any question as to
how many people, if any, actually used this feature, how many people pur-
chased such products, or how many contracts resulted. Apparently this court
equated the Internet activity to directly aiming advertising into the state,
which may be a very rational conclusion. But other circuits, particularly when
dealing with general jurisdiction, would almost certainly need to see whether
this activity resulted in relationships and the quantity thereof.
Thus, different courts across the country use different analysis to reach
different results on the basic, threshold issue of personal jurisdiction. In light
of the explosive growth of the Internet and the looming specter of increased
disputes it brings; however, clear rules and predictability would better serve
the judicial system.
B. Proposed Alternatives to the Tests
Commentators offer a variety of alternatives to the Zippo and effects
tests for determining personal jurisdiction. One such test expounds on the
"something more"/"express aiming" requirement already frequently present
in courts' analyses.162 This test asks whether "the targeting of a specific juris-
diction was itself foreseeable" with foreseeability dependent on three factors:
"contracts, technology, and actual or implied knowledge."' 163 In considering
these factors, a court should take into account "whether either party has used
a contractual arrangement to specify which law should govern,"'164 whether
159. Directory Dividends, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 2003 WL 21961448, *7-
*8 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
160. Id. at *7.
161. Id.
162. See generally Geist, supra note 102, at 1384.
163. Id. at 1385.
164. Id. at 1386.
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the site operator has used some sort of available technology to either target or
avoid a particular jurisdiction,' 65 and "the knowledge the parties had or ought
to have had about the geographic location of the online activity."' 66 The three
factors are analyzed in combination, with no single factor being determina-
tive, to decide "whether the party knowingly targeted the particular jurisdic-
tion and could reasonably foresee being haled into court there."' 67 Whether
this test really adds anything to the issue is questionable. The first factor sim-
ply asks if there is a forum-selection clause, 168 while the second and third
merely facilitate a more detailed "something more" analysis.
Another commentator offers a two-pronged test styled as a "Web-
contacts test."' 69 In the first prong, using the same Zippo scale, a rebuttable
presumption of purposeful availment arises as the Web site moves along the
continuum from passive to clearly doing business.' 70 The second prong asks
whether the defendant targeted the forum state.17 1 This test sounds good in
theory, but, again, the second prong is merely a restatement of the "something
more"/"express aiming" requirement. Additionally, the test bogs down when
one questions the practicality of the first prong. A presumption, after all, is
merely a procedural device for shifting the burden of proof to a party who
does not already bear it. The test, then, only leads to more questions: How
would this presumption function in practice? When exactly would the burden
shift? Does the plaintiff merely have to present some evidence of interactivity
to put the burden on the defendant? Presumptions are either in operation or
they are not. The author describes this prong as, "the more interactive the
Web contacts, the more likely it is the person has purposefully availed him-
self or herself."' 72 To be an actual rebuttable presumption, however, there
must be some basic, threshold fact from which the presumed fact (here, pur-
poseful availment) may be found. This prong is not a presumption but a linear
inference - the higher on the scale, the more likely it is true. Thus, the test
offers nothing beyond what Zippo already offers.
Other commentators have taken a more comprehensive view. For exam-
ple, one author suggests a general reformation of the "purposeful availment"
inquiry, but admits this is unlikely to happen.173 Another commentator rec-
165. Id. at 1393-1401.
166. Id. at 1402.
167. Id. at 1404.
168. This forum selection clause inquiry opens up its own can of worms, which is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
169. Reid, supra note 25, at 260.
170. Id. at 260-61.
171. Id. at 262.
172. Id. at 261.
173. See No Bad Puns, supra note 123, at 1835 ("A broad conception of purpose-
ful availment is too well established in the case law for one to expect any significant
overhaul .... More importantly, while the Supreme Court has been rather vague
about how strict [the 'arising out of prong] should be, it has been somewhat more
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ommends shifting from the post hoc analysis of "minimum contacts" to an ex
ante assessment of jurisdiction by category-specific legislation. 174 Yet another
suggests scrapping the entire "minimum contacts" analysis, along with no-
tions of general versus specific jurisdiction, and replacing it with an "inten-
tional transactional entry," bright-line test for specific jurisdiction.' 75 This test
requires that (1) the defendants know, or be substantially certain, that their
actions will "pierce the borders" of the forum state, (2) the claim arises out of
the defendant's entry into the state; and (3) the defendants enter the state.'
76
Reasonableness is not at issue in this test, as "[a] single act that gives rise to a
claim will always provide jurisdiction."' 77
According to its proponent, this intentional transactional entry test
would "blaze" a path through the "hodgepodge" of Internet jurisdiction
cases. The test would maintain the distinction between merely posting in-
formation and taking directed action.' 79 For instance, shipping products to the
forum state, posting or maintaining interactive sites that send individualized
responses with knowledge of the state where the recipient is located, and
sending e-mail to a person in a known location would all confer jurisdic-
tion.1s Conversely, merely accepting an order, or simply setting up an inter-
active site, would not.18 1 What this test actually does is take quantity out of
the Zippo scale analysis of contacts in the form of relationships. A single
contact is sufficient. This is what Zippo should be.
Rather than discarding the entire progeny of "minimum contacts" cases,
or casting the same test in new language, the Supreme Court should solidify,
and slightly expand, the current analytical framework by combining the Zippo
scale, the effects doctrine, and the concept of targeting into a single test. Such
an "Interactive Web site Test" would require a court to first compare the
claim asserted with the interactivity of the Web site. If the site has no interac-
tive features, then jurisdiction would depend on a traditional effects analysis,
requiring the plaintiff to clearly show both express aiming and a focal point
for the injury. If the site does have interactive features, then the court must
ask whether the tangible or relational contacts that result from those features
are the basis for the claim. If not, the court would also defer to traditional
effects analysis. If so, then the inferential thresholds of express aiming and
focal point are lower, and the plaintiff need only show that the defendant
decisive about [purposeful availment], suggesting that the loose approach that lower
courts have embraced is appropriate.").
174. See generally A "Category Specific" Approach, supra note 33, at 1617.
175. See Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of Personal Jurisdiction,
68 Mo. L. REv. 753, 796 (2003). The test abolishes general jurisdiction. Id. at 797.
176. Id. at 796-98.
177. Id. at 798.
178. Id. at 809.
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knew or should have known with whom it was interacting and that it intended
that interaction. The interaction itself implies the defendant's intent, just as
the presence of the car in Arkansas shows the driver's intent. Defendants who
create Web sites would therefore have the onus and opportunity to protect
themselves. After all, they choose their level of interactivity and could require
an indication of location before entering into any electronic relationship. The
defendant's ability to show deception by the consumer as to such location
should be, in effect, an affirmative defense to jurisdiction.
Thus the Interactive Web Site Test involves only two inquiries, thereby
taking the focus on "quantity" out of the Zippo analysis. If the relationship re-
sulting from an interactive feature is the basis of the claim, then the contact is
of sufficient quality to support specific jurisdiction.'8 2 In some cases, the quan-
tity of the contacts may have a direct correlation to a decision on the merits, for
instance, in a trademark infringement case where "likelihood of confusion" is at
issue. The fact that a single intentional contact with the forum probably will not
be sufficient to support a finding of a "likelihood of confusion" should not de-
feat rightful jurisdiction. If the plaintiff subsequently loses on a summary
judgment motion by the defendant, perhaps an equity argument exists that
would favor awarding attorney's fees to the non-resident defendant.1
8 3
The Interactive Web Site Test also supports a general jurisdiction in-
quiry, under which the court would examine the quantity of tangible and rela-
tional contacts that have resulted from the site's interactive features. If the
quantity is high enough, general jurisdiction would be proper. In the context
of general jurisdiction, quantity serves as a substitute for specific jurisdic-
tion's express aiming and focal point. If the virtual car wreck happens over
and over again, there is a clear inference that the defendants know with whom
and where they are interacting.
Such a test does not alter any existing jurisdictional landscape. It merely
melds the Zippo scale and the effects doctrine into a more workable, simpler
analytical framework. In specific jurisdiction cases, courts would still be able
to infer express aiming from multiple contacts, but would no longer have to
demand these multiple contacts. Rather, plaintiffs could rely on quality of
contacts, by demonstrating knowledge and intent. Defendants could insulate
themselves by making technological choices, but they would not be com-
pletely free to post harmful material. General and specific jurisdiction in
Internet cases would no longer be blurred but would once again comport with
our traditional notions of the two different concepts.
182. This Comment deals with the "purposeful availment" aspect of "minimum
contacts." The "reasonableness" prong, as laid out in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), is beyond its scope.
183. See, e.g., City of Cottleville v. St. Charles County, 91 S.W.3d 148, 150 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2002) ("very unusual circumstances" may demand an equitable balancing of
the benefits) (citation omitted)).
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So, what of Liberty D. Fender and Mid-Missouri Boat Warehouse? Since
the Nevada long-arm statute "permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the same
extent as the Constitution, ' ' 84 the inquiry under the current state of Internet-
based jurisdictional analysis would depend entirely on whether the Web site
constitutes "minimum contacts" with the forum state. The personal injury claim
does not arise out of any feature of the Web site, so our plaintiff needs to estab-
lish general jurisdiction and the Ninth Circuit would apply the Zippo scale.
The Boat Warehouse Web site almost certainly falls into the middle of
the scale, with at least a minimum level of interactivity in its e-mail system
and financing calculator. The site probably does not, however, rise to the
level of doing business in Nevada. It does not appear to be a "virtual store,"
taking orders and payments for any boats, let alone a large quantity of boats,
in Nevada. This site leans more toward the passive side of the scale, thus, a
federal district court operating under the Ninth Circuit's standard would most
likely not find general jurisdiction under these facts. Since specific jurisdic-
tion is not in issue, no effects test analysis would be necessary.
Under the Interactive Web Site Test, the result would be the same, but
the analysis would be different. First, the claim does not arise out of any in-
teractive feature of the site, so the analysis falls, by definition, under general
jurisdiction. The court would then look at any relationships that have resulted
from those interactive features. Because the plaintiff has not shown any quan-
tity of contacts at all, but only the availability of the features, general jurisdic-
tion is not appropriate.
This scenario exemplifies the goal of combining the tests: an easy, pre-
dictable outcome. The parties argue express aiming and resulting effects in each
case, rather than getting bogged down in levels of interactivity and "repeated
transmissions." Quality of contacts can mean a single showing of knowledge
and intent. Thus, quality and quantity would no longer be synonymous.
The Zippo analytical framework demands respect and carries weight in
courts in this country. While some courts might also use Calder's effects
doctrine to examine questions of jurisdiction based on a defendant's Internet
activity, there is no certainty as to what conclusions different courts might
reach in any given case. A simpler test that combines the important aspects of
the two distinct tests could offer a much cleaner and more predictable out-
come in these situations.
ScoTT T. JANSEN
184. Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002); see
NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065 (2001).
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